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doi: 10.1177/000271626435100102pmid: N/A
Three issues divide Russia and China: organiza tion, decision-making, and leadership in the Communist world; revolutionary tactics and strategy in mid-twentieth century; content and form of intrabloc assistance. The Chinese, to protect their minority status and advance their political power, emphasize the sovereignty and independence of each Com munist party and advocate a commonwealth theory of inter national Communist organization. The Soviet Union pays homage to the equality and independence of each party but believes that power must go with responsibility and does not intend to relinquish international Communist leadership to Peking. The Chinese, dissatisfied and unable to compete nation-to-nation with the United States, advocate pushing global revolution, particularly in the non-Western world. The Soviet Union bases its strategy on nation-to nation competition with the United States and unification of the total Socialist camp. The Russians reject any equal-development theory that might disperse Soviet resources too widely. They insist upon the validity of economic co-operation among Communist states. The Chinese, resentful of Soviet preoccupation with Russian power and development, attack Soviet imperialism, the use of aid for political pressure. Thus far, the dispute has passed through five tactical phases. This escalation has been delib erate, after repeated failures of agreement. The underlying cause of the Sino-Soviet conflict is the basic paradox between pluralism in the Communist world and monolithism in Com munist ideology.
doi: 10.1177/000271626435100103pmid: N/A
Under President Charles de Gaulle, the foreign policies of the Fifth French Republic have proved disruptive to the Western alliance, particularly as they challenge the domi nant role of Britain and America in formulating Western policies. Officials and private observers in these countries have been quick to denounce many aspects of de Gaulle's diplomacy. They have been less inclined to understand both its sources and its implications. For, in whatever degree Gaullism collides with principles and strategies accepted in Washington and London, it is clear that de Gaulle's views present a continuing challenge that must be met by something more than criticism and reiteration of established doctrines. The Gaullist challenge has emerged strikingly in three areas of Western policy: in the matter of Atlantic regional unity and co-operation, in the intimate relationship between certain ele ments of Gaullism and the wider global phenomenon known as "neutralism" or "nonalignment," and in the extent to which Gaullism highlights tendencies toward stagnation in Western policies toward major cold-war issues. In this respect, if he has done nothing else, de Gaulle has called attention to issues that have been too long submerged and has compelled policy-makers in Washington and London to face certain realities they have thus far largely preferred to ignore.
doi: 10.1177/000271626435100104pmid: N/A
De Gaulle's anti-"Anglo-Saxon" diplomacy has made it necessary to rethink the "grand design" for an Atlantic partnership. A possible move in the field of nuclear strategy which might take the wind out of de Gaulle's sails would be the formation of a unified command over Western nuclear power composed of a small group of Americans and Europeans, com parable to the wartime British-American combined chiefs of staff. Failing the prevention of the creation of an inward- looking, Gaullist Little Europe, countermeasures should be taken: The Trade Expansion Act should be amended to permit the President to reduce tariffs to zero if necessary to compete with a European bloc with no internal tariffs and common external tariffs. Most-favored-nation provisions should not be included in treaties and trade agreements with nations which follow France into a protectionist European Economic Com munity. Common policies should be developed with those nations which share the original aims of the Atlantic partner ship. The concept of Atlantic partnership should be widened into a "partnership of the free democracies." Within the partnership of free democracies a system of international pay ments should be developed to protect the currencies of its mem bers from outside interference. In all events, hostile retaliation must be avoided and the paths to peace must be explored.
doi: 10.1177/000271626435100105pmid: N/A
The development of nuclear weapons policy in the NATO alliance reflects continuing tension between the preferences of the United States to retain exclusive control of these weapons and the desire of European governments to participate in this control or to deploy their own nuclear forces. This process of interaction has carried NATO policy away from the American unilateral control system, through a stage of "nuclear sharing," and now into the creation of a "NATO nuclear force" by the assignment and co-ordination of national forces already in existence. Attention is now directed to the creation of a multilateral force, but this raises immensely more difficult questions. This continuing controversy over nuclear control is a reflection of the vast changes in the international environment since 1949, most notably the resurgence of the nations of Western Europe. United States nuclear policy has been necessarily modified, reflecting the growth of Europe's strength and the diffusion of nuclear weapons.
doi: 10.1177/000271626435100106pmid: N/A
In the underdeveloped areas of the world, Russia and China are in competition not only with the West but also with each other. Russia stresses the solidarity of the system of Socialist states. China preaches revolutionary war. China accepts the risk of escalation into a general war but in practice moves carefully where this risk might be real. The Chinese believe that time is on their side. Russian hopes are limited principally by the fact that the masses in the underdeveloped countries are unlikely to wait passively for communism to tri umph through economic victory in the advanced countries. The Chinese contradict orthodox Marxism by using a racist appeal in their propaganda in Africa and Asia. The Russians repudiate racist distinctions but find it hard to deny that the working classes of the advanced countries evince little enthu siasm for revolution in the underdeveloped countries. These factors, along with Chinese national qualities of drive, ability, patience, and resilience, give China an ideological advantage in the struggle, even though her material resources and capacity for rendering direct military assistance to revolutions are not great.
doi: 10.1177/000271626435100107pmid: N/A
The Chinese invasion of October-November 1962 shocked the Indian masses as no event since 1947. However, it did not draw them into increasing their agricultural yields or even stepping up their industrial output to the planned rate. India is not fulfilling her plan of preparedness combined with general economic growth. Leadership is diffuse and does not reach the ultimate farm and factory producers. Yet the shock of invasion did sufficiently activate new strata of the voters so that they can now resist some of the mobilization measures adopted since the Chinese withdrawal. This accelerates the crisis in leadership which had already, even before 1962, been looming for a future decade.
doi: 10.1177/000271626435100108pmid: N/A
There has been struggle and warfare in South east Asia for many centuries. The deeply rooted tensions and old hostilities which underlie many of the current conflicts in this ancient cockpit will persist regardless of the outcome, or even the existence, of the Cold War between the Communist and the actively anti-Communist nations. This internal intra- Asian strife is often separate from the much more publicized struggle for Southeast Asia by the great-power leaders in the Cold War which we follow closely. As old European empires die out in Southeast Asia, new Asian empires rise. The clash be tween "Greater Indonesia" and the Federation of Malaysia is a kind of flash back to ancient imperial wars and also a preview of the future. China's resurgence as a great power promises to make her thrust back into areas she once dominated for centuries. The long drawn-out wars in Vietnam have involved the United States more and more deeply without correspond ingly rewarding efforts either to eliminate guerrilla attacks on South Vietnam or to foster a stable and progressive society in South Vietnam. Neutralization of all Vietnam, as for Laos, may be the least undesirable alternative that remains after more than a decade of great effort to stave off Communist domination of former French Indo-China. Co-operative free Asian resistance to communism is a remote possibility.
doi: 10.1177/000271626435100109pmid: N/A
Episodes and experiences of such inclusive in volvement and extreme intensity as the crises arising from the Cuban revolution occur only when long-range and short- run considerations converge in and upon the same event. The long-range factors are defined by the fact and nature of Amer ican power in Cuba since 1895 and by the inability of Cuban society, operating within those limits, either to fulfill the American vision or to translate its own traditions into ongoing institutions and practices. The result was a social and colonial revolution initiated and led by indigenous radicals. Con fronted by this product of its own policies, the United States compounded the crisis by denying the right of the Cubans to carry through such a revolution within Western Hemisphere society. That forced the Cuban radicals to choose between abandoning their revolution or turning elsewhere for assistance. The only meaningful short-run alternative in the resulting im passe is for American leaders to initiate and carry through the first stages of an ideological revolution that will revitalize the tradition of responsible and imaginative upper-class leader ship that was established by the Founding Fathers.
doi: 10.1177/000271626435100110pmid: N/A
The Alliance for Progress had many origins be fore its proclamation in 1961. Its objectives are admirable, grandiose, and, some of them, contradictory. It is beset by complicated organizational and administrative problems, some of which can be resolved. It is endangered by a continuous massive flight of capital to safe havens abroad, of about the same magnitude as the inflow of our aid. It faces great odds of opposition from the oligarchical sectors in Latin America. The Latin-American governments have also been slow in making plans and quick to change the ones made. At the same time, some of them allege that Washington does not allow for great differences in the various countries and state that it is an error in judgment to leave to the United States the apportion ment of financial and economic support. Others object to the requirement that materials must be purchased in the United States and to the post-Cuban motivation of the Alliance. Nevertheless, there is widespread realization throughout the hemisphere that the hour is very late, that population growth is outrunning economic development, and that the power of the United States to influence events is limited. Some of the ruling military juntas do seem to be social-minded, but the upper strata cannot be induced to accept reforms at the pace we deem essential. There is some hope that liberal Catholic leaders, moving from the base of Pope John's Mater et Magistra, may be able to induce centrist groups to co-operate with the democratic left in a broader advance.
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