"ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, The"

Kohler, Foy D.

doi: 10.1177/000271626838000101pmid: N/A

During the next decade, the United States will be facing new global problems unimaginable a few years ago. In attempting to foresee these problems, there are two uncertain factors: (1) the extent of domestic problems' effects on our international role and (2) the extent of isolationist trends engendered by the waning "devil" theory of communism and by the frustrations resulting from the Vietnam war. The realities of the 1970's should include: a continued bipolar world; attempts by the two superpowers to alter international power relationships; greater co-operation between them in areas where neither has an overriding interest; further narrowing of the gap between the superpowers and the secondary powers; greater influence of China in Asia, counterbalanced by her internal struggles and the influence of Japan and India; gravitation of the regional alliances toward politico-economic rather than military objectives; proliferation of nuclear weapons, increasing world instability; widening of the gap between the developed and less-developed nations, with resultant tensions and population problems; increased multilateral aid, accompanied by self-help; and intensified trade and balance-of-payments difficulties. Great change, with potential dangers, will be the keynote of the next decade, but change and opportunity go hand-in-hand. Bold, effective leadership will be needed to deal with the challenges of the 1970's.—Ed.

Furnas, Howard

doi: 10.1177/000271626838000102pmid: N/A

The manner in which the President discharges his foreign affairs responsibilities is likely to change markedly in the next few years, for the atmosphere of our national life is changing. The American mood will not be isolationist. However, the public may, for a number of valid reasons, call for a de-emphasis on foreign affairs. The foreign affairs agencies might then have to co-ordinate themselves, for the President may have neither the time nor the inclination to contribute as he has heretofore. It will also be essential to relate foreign policy more closely to the broader national scene, for in the 1970's foreign affairs will have to compete with domestic needs for resources as well as presidential attention. The President might, therefore, be better served in the future by a Secretary of State with broad national experience rather than by another of the foreign affairs specialists who have held the job in recent administrations. In the period since World War II, there has not evolved any generally satisfactory way of organizing the various foreign affairs agencies to meet the President's needs. President Johnson, however, took a major step forward in providing the Department of State with the legal authority to assert effective leadership over all aspects of American foreign affairs activities. Although the innovation has worked imperfectly so far, it is a good tool, and may be the key to an adequate foreign policy and diplomacy in the 1970's.

Martin, Graham

doi: 10.1177/000271626838000103pmid: N/A

For the turbulent, uncertain world of the 1970's, with the role of the presidency in foreign affairs more limited or less visibly centrally involved, revised organizational modalities become imperative. Foreign affairs staffing of the President should be sufficient to ensure that he is immediately informed of all significant events abroad, but should avoid overcumbersome organizational layers or overintense presidential involvement. This will require the State Department to carry out fully the responsibilities envisioned in National Security Affairs Memorandum (NSAM) 341. Given certain apparently immutable characteristics of American bureaucracy, this will necessitate return of the United States Information Agency (USIA) to the Department, which will give the Secretary of State line control over all major agencies dealing primarily with foreign affairs. It will be necessary to relieve the Secretary's enormous burden by converting the Department's second ranking position to one in which the incumbent can act as true alter ego of the Secretary; by creating a new position of Permanent Under Secretary as the third ranking Department position, where lines of policy and management can converge effectively; and by staffing other high-level positions with individuals capable of making the decisions required by the 1970's. The new President can further strengthen the State Department by giving his full support to the ambassador in his role of "the President's man."

Harr, John Ensor

doi: 10.1177/000271626838000104pmid: N/A

A managerial problem has existed in United States foreign affairs since the early postwar years because of lack of interest in the Department of State in supervising and co-ordinating the broad range of operational programs that had sprung up. Two elite groups within the State Department—the political appointees and the career diplomats— were united in the rationale that their role was in policy, not operations. The management problem became a crisis in 1961 when President Kennedy called for the State Department to take charge. But the Department was singularly unprepared, and a diverse and imaginative program of change, sponsored by the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, ultimately failed. The main reason was that management still remained an alien concept to the political leadership of the State Department and to the dominant conservative faction of the Foreign Service. But, subsequently, a remarkable ferment developed, resulting in a takeover of the American Foreign Service Association by a group of "Young Turks," running on a liberal reform program. This readiness of the Foreign Service for change offers some hope that the State Department will take charge in the 1970's if the political leadership to be appointed by the next administration understands the problem and executes a coherent managerial strategy.

Howe, Fisher

doi: 10.1177/000271626838000105pmid: N/A

Most issues in foreign affairs can only be resolved by intuitive judgments based on knowledge and experience. Some problems, however, are susceptible of more rational, objective treatment, and application of such methods can only be helpful. New methods, including systems analysis and new mathematical techniques, can be usefully employed, in the areas of prediction, factor analysis, and what might be described as prescriptive analysis, in search of the optimum course. Such methods help to sort out the interacting variables with which foreign affairs is replete. Application of these methods will not be easy, partly because of the subject's complexity, partly because of practitioners' resistance to such innovations. In the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS), a useful beginning has been made. Its application, however, to the traditional diplomatic functions— representation, negotiation—will take time and experimentation. State Department foreign affairs planners now direct their work toward analysis of special problems and country studies. In addition, planners fulfill a limited adversary role, offering "alternatives" to recommendations before the decision-makers. These functions can all be strengthened. PPBS should also be pursued, despite very real limitations on its full application. Additionally, changes are needed in organization, method, personnel, and, particularly, commitment if planning is to meet the needs of the new diplomacy.

Platig, E. Raymond

doi: 10.1177/000271626838000106pmid: N/A

Our ability successfully to look forward in the conduct of our foreign relations rests, in large part, upon how we develop and use our resources for research and analysis. At present, these are broadly diffused in both the public and private sectors; a number of stresses and strains indicate that they are not as effectively deployed and utilized as they could be. Improvements are possible on many fronts. Attention here is on the information, research, and analysis needs of the United States government, with particular attention to the Department of State. The Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) occupies a pivotal position. A substantial increase in its capabilities would have many desirable consequences. Among these are: enrichment of INR's own influential analytical research efforts; stimulation and support of the academic search for more coherent and socially relevant knowledge; assurance that the Department will derive the maximum analytical benefit from a modern information-handling system; expanded opportunities to train Foreign Service officers in analytical methods; more balanced and efficacious programs of government contract and grant support for foreign affairs research; and more systematic policy review and development in support of planning. Cost to the American public is estimated at five cents per person per year.

Bray, Charles W.

doi: 10.1177/000271626838000107pmid: N/A

There is widespread agreement among the members of the various foreign services of our government that they are not logically organized. Few innovations have been made in their structure in more than forty years, although there has been a major study of one or more of them every two years since World War II. The Foreign Service Act of 1946, drafted by members of the foreign service themselves and containing the only really successful innovations, has not been fully implemented, and the problems of organization and personnel-administration are increasing rapidly with the multiplication of our foreign services and the broader definition of "diplomacy" today. There should be a single Foreign Service of the United States, directed by an independent board analogous to the Civil Service Commission. In this way, uniform policy could best be assured, and an efficient and progressive personnel-administration could be designed to attract and hold good people in an increasingly competitive employment market.

Haselton, Norris S.

doi: 10.1177/000271626838000108pmid: N/A

Morale can have a significant effect upon the utilization and development of the human resources of diplomacy. For some time, morale in the Department of State and its Foreign Service has not been as good as it should be. A growing number of career officers have come to feel that proven ability and broad professional experience are at a discount as they see an increasing number of top jobs in Washington and appointments in the field going to political appointees and noncareer individuals. Another major morale factor arises from confused and ever-changing patterns of management and administration. This has resulted, in part, from excessive turnover in the Department's highest administrative position and from adoption of varying and sometimes contradictory recommendations made by many outside groups which have studied the Department and the Foreign Service since 1945. Stronger career incentives are needed if morale is to be brought up to desirable levels.

Bean, Elizabeth A.

doi: 10.1177/000271626838000109pmid: N/A

Junior Foreign Service officers share the restless frustration of today's young Americans. They are much more action-oriented than senior officers and have organized to seek redress of grievances. They are especially critical of the State Department's administrative methods and would support constructive reform. They bring to the Foreign Service the recent graduate's appreciation for the possibilities of technological innovation and quantitative analytical techniques. The postwar generation views the United States and its world role idealistically, but modestly. Many junior officers question the relevancy of some foreign policy dogma, but are conscious of their inability to effect change. They would more easily accept their current remoteness from responsibility if their experience with the Foreign Service, and especially with senior officers, were more reassuring as to the prospects of spiritual survival and eventual accession to positions of meaningful authority.

Ullman, Richard H.

doi: 10.1177/000271626838000110pmid: N/A

Because the conduct of international affairs is not a profession, but, rather, involves elements of many professions, there is no single path of education for careers within the foreign affairs establishment. Educational requirements must therefore not be looked upon as a bottleneck restricting access. For this reason, and others, there should be no national academy of foreign affairs. There are three principal varieties of educational experience which may aim specifically at education for the conduct of foreign affairs: preservice graduate training in a university, in-service government-sponsored training, and mid-career education generally (but not always) within universities. Each has its place. The first and last today confront a widening gap between the concerns of the academic social scientist and those of the outcomes-oriented practitioner. Such a gap is in the interest neither of the academic community nor, of course, of the government.