"ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, The"

Bolling, Richard

doi: 10.1177/000271627441100101pmid: N/A

The committee system in the House of Representatives contributes directly to the House's failure to provide vigorous national leadership. By denying the Speaker necessary tools of leadership, by using inadequate informational resources, by abdicating macroeconomic responsibilities and by employing outmoded jurisdictions, House committees clearly reveal the need for significant reorganization. Such reorganization is not impossible to achieve, however; the House of Representatives has changed in the past and, with self-discipline and hard work, can do so again. Signs of change already exist: procedural changes affecting the role of the Speaker, creation of the Office of Technology Assessment and the House Information Systems Office, consideration of fundamental budgetary reform proposals and establishment of the Select Committee on Committees, all point to a climate of reform. The select committee, after debating organizing principles of a committee system within a legislative body, can contribute significantly to this reform by its examination of committees in the House. Several schemes of committee reorganization within the mandate of the Select Committee illustrate generally the parameters of change.

Brock, Bill

doi: 10.1177/000271627441100102pmid: N/A

Senators are dependent on groups of their peers—committees—for consideration of Senate business. In addition, committees are both vital to the legislative process and varied in their structure. In this paper, attention is focused on some of the major problems: committee organization, procedure, activities and realignment. The framework for discussion of the Senate committee system is colored by what has been called the Constitutional balance approach to government. Reforms in the committee system must promote both coequal status of the branches of government and committee responsibility in decision making. If Congress is to assume its proper Constitutional role, it must regain the authority which it has abdicated to the executive branch and must exercise influence in ways which are now neglected by all government. Committee reform can be an important means for achieving this objective; the time for committee reform is now. A strong committee system means a strong Congress.

Kravitz, Walter

doi: 10.1177/000271627441100103pmid: N/A

After a quarter century's reliance on select committees, the Senate established a system of legislative standing committees in 1816. Whereas select committees had been subordinate creatures of the Senate, the standing panels acquired prerogatives which almost completely reversed this relationship. Eventually, the political parties evolved procedures which ensured majority control of the committees, but also granted the minority equitable representation. The seniority system emerged shortly thereafter; however, it differed somewhat from modern usages because of the large number of standing committees. After precipitous increases at the turn of the twentieth century, the Senate drastically reduced the number of committees in 1921 and again in 1946, forcing a change in seniority practices and contributing to the growth of subcommittees. Fewer committees also enhanced the influence of the remaining chairmen. In part, that enhancement provoked moves both to limit the chairmen's authority within their committees and to disperse other positions of power among more members. Other recent trends include more equitable distribution of assignments to important committees, attempts to reduce the overall committee burden of members, growth of committee staff and the evolution of a formal code to regulate committee procedures.

Rohde, David W.

doi: 10.1177/000271627441100104pmid: N/A

Prior to 1971 committee-related reforms in the House were primarily changes in the House rules, which had to be voted on by the full membership. After 1971 most committee reforms were in the form of resolutions passed by the Democratic Caucus. The post-1970 reforms dealt primarily with the selection of committee chairmen and the make-up and powers of subcommittees. The most recent of these reforms was the Subcommittee Bill of Rights which established the method of selection of subcommittee chairmen and members and defined powers and duties of subcommittees. One short run result of the reforms has been the strengthening of the liberals within the House. A possible long run consequence both of the use of the Democratic Caucus as a vehicle for reform and of the reforms, themselves, is the creation of a milieu in which the Democratic leadership can exert a substantially greater influence over outcomes within the House.

Davidson, Roger H.

doi: 10.1177/000271627441100105pmid: N/A

Congressional committees are not little legislatures because they do not accurately reflect the full range of interests articulated in the political system or even in the parent houses. Legislators tend to seek assignments on committees which offer them career advancement; committees, in turn, are most vulnerable to interests with direct stakes in their decisions. More generalized interests are thus underrepresented—a fact which reflects the broader biases of pluralist decision making. Shifts in committee control lag behind social and political changes affecting the electorate at large. Reformers should devise measures to make committee membership more responsive to diverse political viewpoints and to subject the committees to stronger countervailing forces by exposing committee work to closer scrutiny and control by other legislators. Ultimately, intensified social and economic interdependencies may reduce this problem by equalizing the impact of any given problem upon individual constituencies.

Asher, Herbert B.

doi: 10.1177/000271627441100106pmid: N/A

The need for congressmen to specialize and acquire expertise in a limited number of policy areas is so universally conceded as to be labelled a norm of legislative behavior. Specialization is intimately tied to the ability of Congress to make informed voting decisions on a wide range of issues; congressmen often rely upon expert colleagues for information and advice on bills beyond their own expertise. More importantly, specialization, especially as facilitated by the committee system, is an adaptive response to the resource advantages possessed by the executive branch; specialization facilitates congressional performance of the oversight function. In order to determine why and in what areas a congressman will specialize, attention must be given to the member's goals, personal and professional background and electoral situation. Levels of specialization differ across the House and Senate, between national and state legislatures, across committees, and over time. Specialization, particularly as manifested through the committee and subcommittee systems, has both intended and unintended consequences. Foremost among the latter is the differential access to government specialization provides various groups. Finally, the extent of specialization will be affected by changes in the committee system.

Oleszek, Walter J.

doi: 10.1177/000271627441100107pmid: N/A

Although equal in power, the national House and Senate differ in more ways than they are similar. They differ in size, rules and procedures, policy biases, customs and traditions, terms of office, constitutional responsibilities, constituencies and in numerous other ways. Moreover, each chamber is jealous of its powers and prerogatives and generally suspicious of the other body. Despite their differences, the two houses must still work together if policy recommendations are to be enacted into law. Two principal legislative devices serve to join senators and representatives together on matters of common concern: conference committees and joint committees. In this analysis, two important aspects of conference procedure are explored: the conferee selection process and the question of who wins in conference, the House or the Senate. Joint committees, although used since the First Congress, are viewed negatively by many members. Given both the variety and uses of joint committees, it is worth identifying some of the factors which facilitate their creation. Finally, two principal suggestions are offered to better facilitate interhouse cooperation—more contact between respective party leaders of each house and the development of parallel committee jurisdictions. Of course, the goal of interhouse cooperation needs to be balanced against the requirement that each house present and defend different and conflicting points of view on the issues of the day.

Brenner, Philip

doi: 10.1177/000271627441100108pmid: N/A

When congressmen engage in conflict can their behavior be explained by their objective interests as elite decision makers in our society? Congressional conflict can have the consequence of encouraging participation by outsiders, because conflict is contagious. As decision makers, congressmen eschew uncontrollable interference with their deliberations. Conflict can also arouse an interest which is antagonistic to the hierarchic structure of American society, and such arousal is resisted by congressmen. The nature of the conflict over the Higher Education Act of 1972 indicates that, although these considerations alone did not govern congressmen's behavior, they were significantly involved in structuring the conflict. In the first instance one finds that, while the interests at stake were not likely to generate mass arousal, some congressmen did attempt to curtail conflict in order to discourage the involvement of outsiders. In the second instance one finds that congressmen shaped the conflict in a particular way, seemingly, in order to avoid consideration of how education is used to buttress the structure of our society and, thus, to avoid the awakening of mass interests which they recognized were real, though unarticulated. The structure of the committee system significantly contributes to the legislators' abilities to control conflict in at least five ways. In considering reforms of the system, congressmen will take into account the extent to which the reforms alter the committees' role in structuring congressional, conflict.

Fisher, Louis

doi: 10.1177/000271627441100109pmid: N/A

During the autumn months of 1972 President Nixon and Congress engaged in a prolonged and bitter struggle over a spending ceiling. The president wanted a limit of $250 billion for fiscal 1973, with complete discretion to cut wherever needed to preserve the ceiling. Congress refused to grant him such broad discretion. This single incident tells one many valuable things about the relative advantages available to the two branches. While factually wide of the mark, the president's offensive against a big-spending Congress proved to be overpowering in the political arena. Congress lacked the capability—and, probably, also the will—to defend itself. The result was a serious collapse in informed and responsible policy making.

Russell, Mary

doi: 10.1177/000271627441100110pmid: N/A

Committees rely on the press to inform the public about their proceedings and decisions; the press relies on committees, their members and staffs as sources of information. Committee members expect their committee work to further their career and to enhance their reputation. Reporters, in addition to competing for the news, feel they have a critical function to perform. What results is a complicated relationship with ambivalences on both sides. An unholy alliance between the press, committee and staff can exist, with the advantage that issues and facts are brought to light, publicized and needed action is taken. However, newsmen may be used by the staff to float an idea or they may become coopted by the committee point of view and report the story less than fairly. Similarly, committees may be seduced into going for headlines rather than doing less sensational, but equally important, work. Both committees and the press tend to take shortcuts because of the limits on their time. The system the press uses to cover Congress favors attention to subjects and issues rather than to the workings of Congress, itself; Congress, preferring that the press know only that which it wants to disclose, has institutionalized the attitude by closing the doors to some committee hearings. This brings about a conflict in the relationship, as does criticism from the press. In the end, the mutual interdependence of Congress and the press contributes to the good points and the failings of each. While reform would help, the relationship is ultimately based on human values of trust, fairness and responsibility—which rest with the individual.