Human Rights Without Distinction as to Language, Van Dyke, Vernon
doi: 10.2307/3014012pmid: N/A
Abstract The charter of the United Nations requires members to promote human rights without discrimination based on language, raising questions about the meaning of discrimination and about relevant policies and practices around the world. The UN itself chooses official and working languages. Governments choose the language(s) to be employed in their internal operations, in their relationships with the public, and in education. The choices necessarily differentiate, conferring benefits on some and imposing burdens on others. The general rule is that differentiation is nondiscriminatory when the grounds for it are sufficient, which means that judgment is necessary based on a weighing of costs and gains. The costs and gains are not only those of individuals but also those of groups, and the fixing of criteria for identifying the language groups that have legitimate claims is a significant pending problem. This content is only available as a PDF. © 1976 I.S.A.
Satellization and Stagnation in Latin AmericaAlschuler, Lawrence, R.
doi: 10.2307/3014013pmid: N/A
Abstract The present low level of socioeconomic development in Latin America is a deplorable, if well-established, fact. Yet, what are the causal conditions which can explain the developmental change (growth, stagnation, deterioration) in this region? A number of sociologists and economists, many Latin American, seek an explanation in the structured yet asymmetric economic exchanges between developed and underdeveloped countries. Two principal structures of asymmetric exchange are the “international division of labor” and the “international feudal structure.” At least three actors in the international system appear to be responsible for maintaining these exchange structures: institutions of aid, multinational corporations, and clientele classes in underdeveloped countries. If these explanations are tenable, a nation's rate of developmental change should vary with its position in the two exchange structures. Statistical tests involving 18 Latin American nations in the 1960s lend systematic evidence in support of this “satellization produces stagnation” thesis. This content is only available as a PDF. © 1976 I.S.A.
Interactions and Perceptions in the Test Ban NegotiationsHopmann, P., Terrence;King,, Timothy
doi: 10.2307/3014016pmid: N/A
Abstract The Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963 represented the first major breakthrough in postwar arms control negotiations, and thus in some ways laid the foundation for a series of subsequent agreements (especially among the nuclear powers), which have become the primary concrete representations of the present superpower detente. Although many of these agreements may have had little substantive effect upon the arms race, they have at least been affected by and exerted a subsequent impact upon political relations between the communist bloc nations and those of the Western bloc. This article reports on an analysis of the negotiations among the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom leading up to this test ban treaty. Specifically, it applies the two-step mediated stimulus-response model (S—r:s—R) to analyze these negotiations. This model predicts that negotiators' perceptions will be influenced by the behavior of other nations toward their country both outside and inside the negotiating forum, that these perceptions will then be converted into plans about their responses, and finally that these plans will become actualized in overt responses toward other nations, both within and outside negotiations. Several conclusions were reached. First, the perceptual variables generally had little significant impact in mediating between stimuli and responses, although they did appear to exert some influence in the case of Great Britain; in the other cases there was little congruence between changes in perceptions and in actual behaviors over time. Second, the behaviors of the three nuclear powers within the test ban negotiations were highly symmetrical over time; that is, each nation tended to change its responses roughly “in kind” with changes in the stimuli directed toward it from other actors both inside and outside negotiations. Third, there was substantial consistency between the interactions among actors inside and outside negotiations, suggesting that the negotiation process was in some ways a small-scale reflection of the general patterns of conflict and cooperation among the three nuclear powers in their overall interactions. This content is only available as a PDF. © 1976 I.S.A.
Toward an Exploration of Comparative Foreign Policy Distance Between the United States and Latin AmericaA Research NoteVolgy, Thomas, J.;Kenski, Henry, C.
doi: 10.2307/3014017pmid: N/A
Abstract A concept of foreign policy distance is introduced and operationalized through an index based on indicators of imports, diplomatic contacts, UN voting, verbal conflict, and conflict behavior. The index is validated by testing its sensitivity to eight well-known cases of foreign policy distance involving the United States and Latin America. Utilizing the index, the authors identify 45 significant changes in distance in United States/Latin American relations for the period 1953–1970, and classify them by U.S. presidential administration. After speculating about events which are chronologically associated with these changes, the authors argue that the next step is to operationalize competing paradigms in international politics, and using distance change as the dependent variable, to systematically compare and evaluate then-relative potency in accounting for such changes. This content is only available as a PDF. © 1976 I.S.A.
Contributorsdoi: 10.1093/isq/20.1.167pmid: N/A
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