Journal of Political Economy

doi: 10.1086/712595pmid: N/A

doi: 10.1086/712596pmid: N/A

doi: 10.1086/712594pmid: N/A

Martellini, Paolo; Menzio, Guido

doi: 10.1086/710975pmid: N/A

For a search-theoretic model of the labor market, we seek conditions for the existence of a balanced growth path (BGP), where unemployment, vacancy, and worker’s transitions rates remain constant in the face of improvements in the production and search technologies. A BGP exists iff firm-worker matches are inspection goods and the quality of a match is drawn from a Pareto distribution. Declining search frictions contribute to growth with an intensity determined by the tail coefficient of the Pareto distribution. We develop a strategy to measure the rate of decline of search frictions and their contribution to growth.

Benzarti, Youssef; Carloni, Dorian; Harju, Jarkko; Kosonen, Tuomas

doi: 10.1086/710558pmid: N/A

This paper provides evidence that prices respond significantly more strongly to increases than to decreases in value-added taxes (VATs). First, using two plausibly exogenous VAT changes, we show that prices respond twice as much to VAT increases as to VAT decreases. Second, we show that this asymmetry results in higher equilibrium profits and markups. Third, we find that firms operating with low profit margins are particularly likely to respond asymmetrically to VAT changes. Fourth, these asymmetric price effects persist several years after VAT changes take place. Fifth, using all VAT changes in the European Union from 1996 to 2015, we find similar levels of asymmetry.

Arcidiacono, Peter; Hotz, V. Joseph; Maurel, Arnaud; Romano, Teresa

doi: 10.1086/710559pmid: N/A

Using data from Duke University undergraduates, we make three main contributions to the literature. First, we show that data on earnings beliefs and probabilities of choosing particular occupations are highly informative of future earnings and occupations. Second, we show how beliefs data can be used to recover ex ante treatment effects and their relationship with individual choices. We find large differences in expected earnings across occupations and provide evidence of sorting on expected gains. Finally, nonpecuniary factors play an important role, with a sizable share of individuals willing to give up substantial amounts of earnings by not choosing their highest-paying occupation.

Halac, Marina; Yared, Pierre

doi: 10.1086/710560pmid: N/A

A principal faces an agent who is better informed but biased toward higher actions. She can verify the agent’s information and specify his permissible actions. We show that if the verification cost is small enough, a threshold with an escape clause (TEC) is optimal: the agent either chooses an action below a threshold or requests verification and the efficient action above the threshold. For higher costs, however, the principal may require verification only for intermediate actions, dividing the delegation set. TEC is always optimal if the principal cannot commit to inefficient allocations following the verification decision and result.

Eden, Maya

doi: 10.1086/710561pmid: N/A

How much should society be willing to pay for reducing inequality? The standard approach to this normative question relates inequality aversion to risk aversion by treating inequality as an outcome of a lottery. However, in the presence of heterogeneous risk preferences, it is unclear whose preferences should be used for evaluating this lottery. This paper derives a social welfare function as a limit of an iterative procedure, in which each iteration constructs a lottery based on the certainty equivalents from the previous iteration. The limit of this procedure can be interpreted as the equally distributed equivalent of the initial allocation.

Azevedo, Eduardo M.; Deng, Alex; Montiel Olea, José Luis; Rao, Justin; Weyl, E. Glen

doi: 10.1086/710607pmid: N/A

We propose a new framework for optimal experimentation, which we term the “A/B testing problem.” Our model departs from the existing literature by allowing for fat tails. Our key insight is that the optimal strategy depends on whether most gains accrue from typical innovations or from rare, unpredictable large successes. If the tails of the unobserved distribution of innovation quality are not too fat, the standard approach of using a few high-powered “big” experiments is optimal. However, if the distribution is very fat tailed, a “lean” strategy of trying more ideas, each with possibly smaller sample sizes, is preferred. Our theoretical results, along with an empirical analysis of Microsoft Bing’s EXP platform, suggest that simple changes to business practices could increase innovation productivity.

Chiappori, Pierre-André; Oreffice, Sonia; Quintana-Domeque, Climent

doi: 10.1086/710838pmid: N/A