Competition, Monopoly and Countervailing PowerAdams, Walter
doi: 10.2307/1883596pmid: N/A
Abstract I. Introduction, 469. — II. Top-level financial control and vertical integration, 472. — III. Bilateral monopoly and countervailing power, 475. — IV. Technological and inter-industry competition, 477. — V. The role of government, 480. — VI. Size, technology, and efficiency, 487. — VII. Conclusion, 491. This content is only available as a PDF. Copyright, 1953, by the President and Fellows of Harvard College
The Case for Accelerated DepreciationDomar, Evsey, D.
doi: 10.2307/1883597pmid: N/A
Abstract Introduction, 493. — I. Assumptions, 494. — II. Financing investment from internal funds, 496. — III. Various schemes of accelerated depreciation, 499: the American system, 500; the British system, 504; the hybrid system, 506. — IV. Conclusion, 508. — Mathematical appendix, 513. This content is only available as a PDF. Author notes * This essay was written under a Fulbright grant at the University of Oxford Institute of Statistics. Thanks are due to F. A. Burchardt, the Director, for his generous offer of the facilities of the Institute, and for many other things. Comments made by P. H. Ady, E. J. M. Buckatzsch, D. G. Holland, A. W. Romanis, P. P. Streeten and G. D. N. Worswick made me rewrite many a paragraph. I am very grateful to them. The responsibility for any remaining errors and for all conclusions is, of course, mine. Copyright, 1953, by the President and Fellows of Harvard College
Classical Theory, Graham's Theory, and Linear Programming in International TradeWhitin, T., M.
doi: 10.2307/1883598pmid: N/A
Abstract I. Introduction, 520. — II. A simple model, 522. — III. An examination of Graham's principal conclusions, 526. — IV. Relaxation of the assumptions, 537. — V. Relation to linear programming, 540. — Mathematical Appendix, 542. * " This article embodies the results of research sponsored by the Office of Naval Research, Contract N6onr-27009 at Princeton University. The author is indebted to Dr. Oskar Morgenstern of this project and Dr. J. N. Behrman of Washington and Lee University for helpful criticism. Particular gratitude is owed to Mr. William M. Young of this project for several suggestions that have caused important changes in the manuscript. This content is only available as a PDF. Copyright, 1953, by the President and Fellows of Harvard College
Full Capacity vs. Full Employment GrowthPilvin, Harold
doi: 10.2307/1883599pmid: N/A
Abstract I. Criticism of recent literature on the growth problem, 545. — II. Summary of Hamberg's principal arguments, 546. — III. The models of Domar and Harrod, 548. — IV. Proposal of an improved model which takes account of a “normal” production function, 549. — V. Geometric treatment of the model, 551. This content is only available as a PDF. Author notes * I am happy to acknowledge my indebtedness to Professors Evsey Domar of the Johns Hopkins University and Arnold Harberger of the University of Chicago. My ideas have been greatly clarified as a result of their criticisms. Copyright, 1953, by the President and Fellows of Harvard College
The Retarded Acceptance of the Marginal Utility TheoryKauder,, Emil
doi: 10.2307/1883602pmid: N/A
Abstract Introduction, 564. — I. Importance of religious backgrounds in seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 565. — II. Place of work in social theology, 566. — III. Delayed acceptance in the nineteenth century, 570. — IV. Conclusion, 573. This content is only available as a PDF. Copyright, 1953, by the President and Fellows of Harvard College
Structural Reform in the British Miners' UnionBaldwin, George B.
doi: 10.2307/1883603pmid: N/A
Abstract I. Structure of the Mineworkers' Federation of Great Britain, 577. — II. Growing disenchantment with district autonomy, 580. — III. Culmination of the unification movement in the Nottingham Conference of 1944, 589. — IV. Summary, 596. This content is only available as a PDF. Copyright, 1953, by the President and Fellows of Harvard College