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doi: 10.1177/1532673X9101900402pmid: N/A
This article develops an analytical model of partisan redistricting (gerrymandering) in which control of state government is used to promote party and incumbent goals. The model suggests that elected officials confront a tradeoff between margins of victory for their party's House candidates and the number of seats captured. Aregression analysis of 1982 House election results provides empirical support for the model. The findings indicate that a complete reversal of party control of state government prior to redistricting would make it possible for the dominant party to gain 6% to 7% additional House seats, and would permit it to protect between 17% and 25% of its candidates from significant challenges from the other party. Studies which attempt to measure the presence of gerrymandering by concentrating on one measure or the other, but not both, will underestimate the effectiveness of redistricting as a partisan tool.
doi: 10.1177/1532673X9101900404pmid: N/A
According to conventional wisdom, policy-making tends to be incremental in character except under conditions of united party control of the presidency and Congress and, in particular, after a critical or realigning election. The 1986 Tax Reform Act violates this expectation. This case study examines the act to understand its passage and develops an alternative to the party government model to explain innovative policy-making under conditions of divided party government.
doi: 10.1177/1532673X9101900405pmid: N/A
This article (1) evaluates The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA) in terms of tax reform criteria; (2) analyzes the historical importance of TRA relative to earlier reform and nonreform tax legislation; and (3) poses three different explanatory models for why this historic tax bill was enacted. The author argues that the 1986 legislation was not only major tax reform, but a radical departure from the usual standards of incremental tax legislation. Of the three explanatory models, the author argues that it is most likely that the act is a combination of epiphenomenal events and reactive legislation, than a true watershed indicating a long-term change of direction in tax policy. The final section of the article summarizes the lessons learned from 1986 and outlines the importance of the various explanations for understanding current congressional behavior on fiscal policy.
doi: 10.1177/1532673X9101900406pmid: N/A
Most efforts to develop a theory of tax policy change have emphasized institutional, procedural, and partisan explanations. By contrast, very little attention has been directed toward the budgetary context within which tax policy is determined. The long-term evolution of federal income tax policy, however, demonstrates the importance of budgetary context and constraints, and this relationship is particularly evident in the case of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Passage of this comprehensive reform measure depended on a revenue-neutral standard that ignored the traditional norms governing aggregate revenue levels.
doi: 10.1177/1532673X9101900407pmid: N/A
Popular demand for greater equity in the tax code is credited for the enactment of the Tax Reform of 1986. An exclusive focus on fairness, however, obscures the importance of growth as a causal factor. It is argued here that the radical transformation of the corporate code was based on a vastly different strategy for economic growth and productive investment. Conventional wisdom also has it that the reform effort represented the triumph of ideas over special interests. But this article suggests that a new industrial coalition of business supporters was critical to the enactment of this alternative growth strategy.
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