Biology & Philosophy

Andrews, Kristin

doi: 10.1007/s10539-023-09918-wpmid: N/A

Suárez, Javier

doi: 10.1007/s10539-023-09930-0pmid: N/A

This paper presents an account of the nature of stem cells based on the philosophical concept of disposition. It is argued that stem cells can be conceived as dispositional objects, and adopting this attitude allows overcoming some of the controversies surrounding the nature of stemness (most notably, the state vs. entity debate) because it offers a framework that accommodates the lessons from different theories. Additionally, the account is simultaneously useful for interpreting stem cell experiments and guiding potential interventions. The account shows how different levels, both molecular and emergent network-level, play the primary causal role in explaining some empirical results, and hence they suggest that the explanations can be mechanistic or topological, respectively. The realization that any of these levels may play a more prominent causal role than another allows suggesting interventions at the genetic, molecular and population levels.

Sterner, Beckett; Elliott, Steve; Wideman, Jeremy G.

doi: 10.1007/s10539-023-09933-xpmid: N/A

We characterize a type of functional explanation that addresses why a homologous trait originating deep in the evolutionary history of a group remains widespread and largely unchanged across the group’s lineages. We argue that biologists regularly provide this type of explanation when they attribute conserved functions to phenotypic and genetic traits. The concept of conserved function applies broadly to many biological domains, and we illustrate its importance using examples of molecular sequence alignments at the intersection of evolution and cell biology. We use these examples to show how the study of conserved functions can integrate knowledge of a trait’s causal effects on fitness and its history of natural selection without invoking adaptation. We also show how conserved function provides a novel basis for addressing objections against evolutionary functions raised by Robert Cummins.

Levy, Arnon

doi: 10.1007/s10539-023-09915-zpmid: N/A

I offer a defense, albeit a qualified one, of machine analogies in biology, focusing on molecular contexts. The defense is rooted in my prior work (Levy in Philosopher’s Imprint 14(6), 2014), which construes the machine machine-likeness of a system as a matter of the extent to which it exhibits an internal division of labor. A concrete aim is to shore up the notion of molecular biological machines, paying special attention to processive molecular motors, such as Kinesin. But I will also try to show how the division of labor account gives us guidance more broadly, both about where and why machine analogies can be expected to prove helpful and about their limitations.

Zalucki, Oressia; Brown, Deborah J.; Key, Brian

doi: 10.1007/s10539-023-09924-ypmid: N/A

Deciphering the neural basis of subjective experience remains one of the great challenges in the natural sciences. The structural complexity and the limitations around invasive experimental manipulations of the human brain have impeded progress towards this goal. While animals cannot directly report first-person subjective experiences, their ability to exhibit flexible behaviours such as motivational trade-offs are generally considered evidence of sentience. The worm Caenorhabditis elegans affords the unique opportunity to describe the circuitry underlying subjective experience at a single cell level as its whole neural connectome is known and moreover, these animals exhibit motivational trade-offs. We started with the premise that these worms were sentient and then sought to understand the neurons that were both necessary and sufficient for a motivational trade-off involving the rewarding experience of food and the negative experience of an aversive odour. A simple hierarchical network consisting of two chemosensory neurons and three interneurons was found to produce an output to motoneurons that enabled worms to respond in a contextually appropriate manner to an aversive odour according to the worm's hunger state. Given that this circuitry is like that found in the human spinal cord, retina, and primary visual cortex, three regions which are neither necessary nor sufficient for subjective experience, we conclude that motivational trade-offs are not a criterion for subjective experience in worms. Furthermore, once the neural substrate for a behaviour is described, we question the explanatory role of subjective experience in behaviour.

Cuypers, Vincent; Reydon, Thomas A. C.

doi: 10.1007/s10539-023-09925-xpmid: N/A

Human interaction with the living world, in science and beyond, always involves classification. While it has been a long-standing scientific goal to produce a single all-purpose taxonomy of life to cater for this need, classificatory practice is often subject to confusion and disagreement, and many philosophers have advocated forms of classificatory pluralism. This entails that multiple classifications should be allowed to coexist, and that whichever classification is best, is context-dependent. In this paper, we discuss some practical consequences of classificatory pluralism, in particular with regard to how one is supposed to find the best classification for a given context. We do so by means of a case study concerning oaks, in particular the pedunculate oak (Quercus robur L.) and the sessile oak (Quercus petraea (Matt.) Liebl.), two important putative species that present several classificatory challenges; and by applying one recent philosophical framework conceptualizing classification, the so-called Grounded Functionality Account (GFA) of (natural) kinds. We show how the GFA elucidates several issues related to oak classification and gives directions to optimize classificatory practices, and discuss some implications for scientific taxonomy.

Sfara, Emiliano; El-Hani, Charbel N.

doi: 10.1007/s10539-023-09927-9pmid: 37720550

A recent idea of “ecosystem health” was introduced in the 1970s and 1980s to draws attention to the fact that ecosystems can become ill because of a reduction of properties such as primary productivity, functions and diversity of interactions among system components. Starting from the 1990s, this idea has been deeply criticized by authors who argued that, insofar as ecosystems show many differences with respect to organismic features, these two kinds of systems cannot share a typical organismic property such as health. In recent years, an organisational approach in philosophy of biology and ecology argued that both organisms and ecosystems may share a fundamental characteristic despite their differences, namely, organisational closure. Based on this kind of closure, scholars have also discussed health and malfunctional states in organisms. In this paper, we examine the possibility of expanding such an organisational approach to health and malfunctions to the ecological domain. Firstly, we will see that a malfunction is related to a lower effectiveness in the functional behaviour of some biotic components with respect to other systemic components. We will then show how some introduced species do not satisfactorily interact in an organisational closure with other ecosystem components, thus posing a threat to the self-maintenance of the ecosystem in which they are found. Accordingly, we will argue that an ecosystem can be said to be healthy when it is a vital environment organisationally grounded on its intrinsic capacity to ensure, under favourable conditions, appropriate functional behaviours for ecosystem components and ecosystem self-maintenance.

Silvestros, Pavlos

doi: 10.1007/s10539-023-09932-ypmid: N/A

Despite the undeniable epistemic progress of developmental biology from the second half of the twentieth century to the present day, there still is widespread disagreement on defining the biological term of ‘development’. This scientific field epistemologically is neither unsuccessful nor immature, thus the persistent lack of agreement on its most central concept raises some important questions: is there any need for an explicit definition of biological development, and if so, what content should the definition have? My central thesis is twofold. First, that current definitions of biological development are conceptually or empirically inadequate. Second, that an explicit definition of biological development is very much needed (a) for the practical purposes of science textbooks, but more importantly is needed (b) epistemically for exposing or overcoming problematic assumptions and for partially guiding scientific research by coding the appropriate assumptions. To support this thesis, initially I will show the deficiencies of the dominant definitions of biological development; and subsequently I will provide two arguments: an Argument from Practical Purposes and an Argument from Epistemic Purposes. Finally, for accommodating practical and epistemic purposes and as a response to the inadequacy of the available definitions of development, I will propose and defend an operational definition of biological development which is aimed to be broader than the received ones, while being more precise and fruitful to conduct empirical research.

Hoffman, Kate Nicole

doi: 10.1007/s10539-023-09926-wpmid: N/A

Nature-based solutions (NbS) have in recent years occupied a central position in conservation and climate discussions among both scientists and policy makers. NbS generally identify a set of strategies which use nature, or natural objects, to address societal (human) issues while simultaneously supporting the broader environment. Rather than criticize NbS on the grounds that the concept is too vague to be truly action-guiding (a criticism that is already well-recognized), I instead argue, through an examination of the literature, that the term NbS should be understood as referring to the protection and implementation of “blue/green” areas and infrastructure. I then investigate whether NbS, conceived of in this way, can be justified as a category worthy of our serious consideration. I argue that the environmental impact of artificial analogues, human-made constructions that share certain functional features with natural (non-human-made) structures, gives us reason to doubt that blue/green forms of infrastructure can truly be prioritized over other strategies on biodiversity grounds. Yet rather than reject the category of NbS completely, I suggest that these strategies may nevertheless have an advantage insofar as they play a vital aesthetic role in developing a healthier relationship between humans and the nonhuman world.

Lean, Christopher H.; Jones, Christopher J.

doi: 10.1007/s10539-023-09929-7pmid: N/A

Two or more independent species lineages can fuse through an evolutionary transition to form a single lineage, such as in the case of eukaryotic cells, lichens, and coral. The fusion of two or more independent lineages requires intermediary steps of increasing selective interdependence between these lineages. We argue a precursory selective regime of such a transition can be Multilevel Selection 1 (MLS1). We propose that intraspecies MLS1 can be extended to ecological multispecies arrangements. We develop a trait group selection (MLS1) model applicable to multispecies mutualistic interactions. We then explore conditions under which such a model could apply to mutualistic relationships between pollinators and plants. We propose that MLS1 could drive transitions towards higher interdependency between mutualists and stabilise obligate mutualisms in the face of invasion by cheater variants. This represents a radical extension of multilevel selection theory, applying it to the evolution of multispecies populations, and indicating new avenues for researching ecological community evolution.