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CHAMBERLIN, JOHN R.; SCHEPPELE, KIM LANE
doi: 10.1177/1043463191003001003pmid: N/A
This article examines the law pertaining to secrecy in contractual bargaining and argues that courts decide cases more consistently with contractarian principles than with economic ones. The economic theory of law claims that courts ought to require people to disclose secret information when that information was acquired as a by-product of other productive activity and to allow people to keep information secret when it was the product of significant investment. The contractarian theory argues that courts ought to (a) protect people from catastrophic losses, (b) require disclosure of secrets whose existence is not known to others, and (c) allow bargainers to keep visible secrets provided that their bargaining partners face roughly equal costs of acquiring the same information. A model is developed that specifies the effects of various information asymmetries in bargaining and shows how the courts focus on correcting the sorts of asymmetries that a contractarian would worry about rather than on correcting those asymmetries that an economic analyst would find most important.
COLL, JUAN CARLOS MARTINEZ; HIRSHLEIFER, JACK
doi: 10.1177/1043463191003001004pmid: N/A
Besides meeting the Nash condition (Axelrod's so-called “collective stability”), an evolutionary equilibrium must be an attractor—either an evolutionary equilibrium point (EEP) or an evolutionary equilibrium region (EER). In this analysis of Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken environments, the “archetype” strategies (COOPERATE and DEFECT in Prisoners' Dilemma and COWARD and DAREDEVIL in Chicken) were augmented by the “reactive” strategies TIT FOR TAT and BULLY—entering separately in 3 x 3 interactions and jointly in 4 x 4 interactions. An instant-response assumption was employed that stacked the deck somewhat in favor of TIT FOR TAT. Nevertheless, in no case was all-TIT FOR TAT ever an EEP, although some conditions generated a mixed EER with only “nice” behaviors represented. A credible model should imply an equilibrium in which both “mean” and “nice” behaviors are represented. Remarkably, none of the conditions postulated here led to such an outcome. This unsatisfying result suggests the importance of introducing a PUNISHER strategy as described elsewhere by the authors.
MERRILL, SAMUEL; TIDEMAN, NICOLAUS
doi: 10.1177/1043463191003001005pmid: N/A
This article compares empirically the average utility for the electorate of the candidates selected by approval voting and by ranking-based voting with a search for a Condorcet winner (a Condorcet-completion procedure). “Feeling thermometer” scores from the presidential election surveys for 1972 through 1984 of the Institute for Survey Research are used for distributions of utilities of candidates for voters. Several hypotheses about voting behavior under approval voting are explored, while voters using a Condorcet completion procedure are assumed to rank the candidates according to the utility they offer. The average social utilities of the candidates chosen by these voting systems are remarkably similar, while that for single-vote plurality (under sincere voting) is significantly lower.
doi: 10.1177/1043463191003001006pmid: N/A
Antagonists in the ancient controversy over world multilingualism agree that a successful artificial language must overcome a coordination problem: to motivate learners when few speak the language. It is believed that a take-off point must be reached, after which the spread of such a language would be self-sustaining. This problem may also frustrate other linguistic and nonlinguistic innovations. The dynamics of recruitment and defection, however, render a take-off point analysis dubious. A simple model of artificial language evolution supports this doubt. Despite low learning cost, universal competence in an artificial language, if achieved, might be unstable. More generally, any degree of penetration by an artificial language, from 0% to 100% of the world population, might be stable. The results help interpret the fact that the artificial language movement is small yet stable, frustrated yet complacent, and convinced that language choice is a social dilemma that needs coordination to prevent a deficient outcome.
SCHWARTZ-SHEA, PEREGRINE; SIMMONS, RANDY T.
doi: 10.1177/1043463191003001007pmid: N/A
In the standard n-Prisoners' Dilemma (nPD), defection is generally interpreted as evidence of egoistic or self-interested motives. Cooperation, however, is compatible with (at least) two motives: universalism, a generalized norm that one should restrain one's selfish impulses to benefit humanity, and parochialism, the norm that one owes cooperation to one's “solidarity group.” In contrast to research supporting the parochial explanation of cooperation, this article presents experimental evidence in support of what is called here “discriminating universalism.” Groups of interacting individuals will restrain their parochial tendencies if they perceive the outgroup affected by their choices as worthy of their help. The findings suggest that, for a group of interacting individuals, neither general normative appeals nor individually based material incentives will mitigate parochial choices. Instead, strategies to limit parochialism must directly confront the comparative worthiness of specific groups.
Brough, Wayne T.; Elliott, V. L.
doi: 10.1177/1043463191003001008pmid: N/A
The Forum consists of comments on previously published papers and responses by authors. Unlike the Comment section in many other academic journals, the Forum includes solicited as well as unsolicited contributions. We encourage debates by actively seeking points of view contrary to those expressed in articles published in the journal. The Forum section is intended to promote an open and critical debate that contributes to the intellectual vitality and further development of rational-choice-based theory and research.Forum contributions should follow the form used by Rationality and Society and should not exceed five double-spaced pages.
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