journal article
LitStream Collection
Home
doi: 10.1177/1043463193005001003pmid: N/A
This article argues that Alfred Schütz, one of the founders of the interpretative paradigm in sociology, developed a theory of action whose basic structure is compatible with subjective expected utility theory (i.e., a specific variant of rational choice theory. Alfred Schütz's view with respect to the characteristics of everyday action—the individual orientation toward routines and structures of relevance—is modeled in terms of subjective expected utility theory. In this perspective, these characteristics appear as the result of an action-preceding rational choice in the process of the cognition of situations, under the conditions of bounded rationality.
doi: 10.1177/1043463193005001004pmid: N/A
Hartmut Esser states an extensive correspondence of rational choice theory and Alfred Schütz's interpretative sociology. He postulates the possibility of explaining everyday behavior using a rational choice (RC) approach that is “relaxed” by employment of actors' subjective knowledge. My comment traces the stated correspondence to its origins in Schütz's work and points out the limits of the RC model that emerge from Schütz's discussion of Ludwig von Mises' theory of action: Although the RC approach recognizes that the conditions of action are selected by actors' subjective stock of knowledge, it does not offer any theoretical explanation for the social constitution of this knowledge, nor for the selectivity of its everyday structures.
doi: 10.1177/1043463193005001005pmid: N/A
The article responds to Hartmut Esser's essay, “The Rationality of Everyday Behavior. A Rational Choice Reconstruction of the Theory of Action by Alfred Schütz,” which also appears in this issue. The author provides historical and contextual evidence in support of Esser's thesis that Schutz's theory of action converges with rational choice theory in fundamental respects. He is more critical of Esser's second purpose, however, which is to subsume Schutz's theory of action under the framework of subjective expected utility theory. Prendergast argues that the two-step selection rule that Esser devises to this end reduces rational choice to a tautology.
doi: 10.1177/1043463193005001006pmid: N/A
Esser makes a useful contribution in extracting from Schutz a model of the rationality of choosing among projects of action, thereby indicating a second order of rationality in choosing whether to calculate or to stick with an accepted routine. This concern for the rational calculability of action was not a major part of Schutz's philosophical interests, and the credit for developing the model should go to Esser. One consequence of this model is that social action should alternate between long periods of accepted routines and sudden changes to another bundle of habits. Esser's suggestion that institutional norms are the basis of routines does not help explain where alternative schemata come from, nor how individuals estimate the subjective probability of finding alternatives. The problems of limited cognition and of incommensurable scales exist at the level of second-order rationality as well. For these reasons, I have argued that the rational pursuit of interests operates via the flow of emotional energy attached to various courses of action.
doi: 10.1177/1043463193005001007pmid: N/A
In different disciplines, different answers tend to be given to the question of which distribution of income is considered desirable by an individual. Studies dealing with this question are generally of a monodisciplinary nature. This article, on the other hand, is intended to be a contribution to an interdisciplinary approach to this question. First, the answers given by social psychologists and sociologists, on the one hand, and by economists, on the other, are presented. Subsequently, the relation between equitable and preferable distributions is investigated. Finally, the article deals with the conditions under which utility maximization yields the choice of an equitable distribution.
POLLOCK, GREGORY B.; LEWIS, KEITH A.
doi: 10.1177/1043463193005001008pmid: N/A
Prospect choice is generally viewed as a game against nature. This article models prospect choice as an n-person game where each subject assumes that n-1 others will be exposed to the same decision problem (prospect choice set) as self; the goal is not to “beat nature” but to do relatively better than rivals exposed to the same problem. Preference becomes strategy choice in n-person Nash equilibrium. When symmetric pure strategy equilibria do not exist, choice is a symmetric randomized equilibrium; here, uncertainty (probabilistic response) becomes a method of dealing with uncertainty in nature. The approach produces, qualitatively, several empirical expected utility paradoxes (the certainty effect, intransitive cycles, and one form of reflection), and an evolutionary game-theoretic extension accounts for all the phenomena revealed by the research of Kahneman and Tversky.
KAEMPFER, WILLIAM H.; LOWENBERG, ANTON D.
doi: 10.1177/1043463193005001009pmid: N/A
Voter turnouts differ significantly across societies, and in some polities voting is compulsory. To explain differences in voter turnout it is necessary first to explain the variation in compulsion policies that exists across societies. A threshold model of collective action is used to provide an explanation for compulsion policies, which are treated as endogenous. Governments and parties are viewed as “demanding” turnout as a means to enhance political support. This theory suggests that voter turnout is high, and possibly government mandated, in societies that have high levels of political polarization and that use proportional representation. The predictions of the theory are tested using cross-country data.
doi: 10.1177/1043463193005001010pmid: N/A
Shakespeare's Hamlet is the classic case of an individual who cannot make a decision, and classic explanations are in terms of “deep psychology”—a paradigm that searches for causes of behavior deep within the individual's psyche. This article shows, however, that the play can be coherently and simply understood in terms of “shallow psychology”—a paradigm that turns attention to the difficulties attendant on rational decision making, emphasizing, most importantly, constraints on information that is necessary for good decision making. Hamlet is shown to be a case of decision making under uncertainty, where the consequences of error are unthinkable and where a decision cannot be avoided. Far from showing us a personality constitutionally unable (for whatever deep reason) to decide, the play shows us the difficulties attendant on this class of decision problems—a demonstration highlighted by the fact that those difficulties must be faced by an individual better equipped than most for decisive action. The play also shows us the only satisfactory way for resolving such a problem. A de-emphasis on personality and a turning of critical attention to the structure of situations that normal people confront might contribute not only to an understanding of this particular play and of dramatic tragedy but also to our understanding of decision making in general.
Showing 1 to 10 of 11 Articles