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doi: 10.1002/bs.3830240402pmid: N/A
This article deals with the evolution of general systems thinking over the past quarter‐century, as reflected in the annals of the Society for General Systems Research. Likewise, on the basis of that evolution, the author speculates as to how best we can now provide mechanisms for implementing the theory that has been developed. In this time of critical need for utilization of general systems thinking in man's affairs the world over, it is argued that the Society should now stress application as much as research.
doi: 10.1002/bs.3830240403pmid: 486047
This is the sixth Ludwig von Bertalanffy Memorial Lecture, delivered at the 1979 Annual Meeting of the Society for General Systems Research at Houston, Texas.
Gillespie, John V.; Zinnes, Dina A.; Tahim, G. S.; Sampson, Martin W.; Schrodt, Philip A.; Michael Rubison, R.
doi: 10.1002/bs.3830240404pmid: N/A
A mathematical model representing the notion of deterrence theory, as depicted in the literature, is studied. This model applies to decision processes of supranational systems. A nation deters its adversary by its capacity to absorb a first attack and to render a retaliatory attack. To construct the model representing this, concepts from the optimal control theory are used. The optimal policy is derived and the parameters in the model are estimated from defense expenditures of various nations involved in three post‐World War II arms races. From the model so constructed, the stability properties of three current arms races are analyzed.
Andrew Michener, H.; Ginsberg, Irving J.; Yuen, Kenneth
doi: 10.1002/bs.3830240405pmid: N/A
This paper reports an experimental test of three competing theories of payoff allocation (the Shapley, equality, and nucleolus solutions) in n‐person conflicts. These tests apply to decision making in group systems. Three‐hundred twenty subjects participated in four‐person cooperative, nonconstant sum, nonempty core games with side‐payments. The manipulated experimental variables included core size, location of the equality vector with respect to the core, and column difference of payoff matrices. Results show that the Shapley solution is superior to the nucleolus solution in terms of predictive accuracy. Moreover, the Shapley solution is robust to experimental treatments and thus appears to be more useful than the equality solution. Related findings indicate a high percentage of Pareto optimal outcomes (83%) and a higher frequency of outcomes falling in the core when the equality vector is located inside the core than when it is located outside. Findings are discussed in terms of core properties.
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