TY - JOUR
AU - Chu, Leon Yang
AB - We address the mechanism design problem for a market with multiple buyers and sellers. Each buyer demands some bundle(s) of various commodities, and each seller supplies multiple units of one commodity. To design truthful double-auction mechanisms, we propose a novel padding method that intentionally creates imbalances between the supply availability and demand requirement by introducing a phantom buyer with unlimited budget. To the best of our knowledge, this padding method leads to a class of mechanisms that are the first strategy-proof, individually rational, budget-balanced, and asymptotically efficient mechanisms for the specified exchange environment. Furthermore, these mechanisms dominate known truthful bundle/single-unit mechanisms with higher efficiency, lower buying prices, and higher selling prices.
TI - Truthful Bundle/Multiunit Double Auctions
JF - Management Science
DO - 10.1287/mnsc.1090.1015
DA - 2009-07-21
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/informs/truthful-bundle-multiunit-double-auctions-19zHeA0w85
SP - 1184
EP - 1198
VL - 55
IS - 7
DP - DeepDyve
ER -