TY - JOUR
AU1 - Dickhaut, John
AU2 - McCabe, Kevin
AU3 - Mukherji, Arijit
AB - We examine strategic information transmission in an experiment. Senders are privately informed about a state. They send messages to Receivers, who choose actions resulting in payoffs to Senders and Receivers. The payoffs depend on the action and the state. We vary the degree to which the Receivers' and the Senders' preferences diverge. We examine the relationship between the Senders' messages and the true state as well as that between actions and the true state and contrast the ability of different equilibrium message sets to explain the data.
TI - An experimental study of strategic information transmission
JF - Economic Theory
DO - 10.1007/BF01211783
DA - 2005-02-08
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/springer-journals/an-experimental-study-of-strategic-information-transmission-4D1vLcImdU
SP - 389
EP - 403
VL - 6
IS - 3
DP - DeepDyve
ER -