TY - JOUR
AU - MICHELS, JEREMY
AB - Standard setters explicitly state that disclosure should not substitute for recognition in financial reports. Consistent with this directive, prior research shows that investors find recognized values more pertinent than disclosed values. However, it remains unclear whether reporting items are recognized because they are more relevant for investing decisions, or whether requiring recognition itself prompts differing behavior on the part of firms and investors. Using the setting of subsequent events, I identify the differential effect of requiring disclosure versus recognition in a setting where the accounting treatment of an item is exogenously determined. For comparable events, I find a stronger initial market response for firms required to recognize relative to firms that must disclose, although the large magnitude of the identified effect calls into question whether this difference can be attributed to accounting treatments alone. In examining various reasons for the stronger market response to recognized values, I fail to find support for the hypothesis that this difference is due to differential reliability of disclosed and recognized values. I do find some evidence that investors underreact to disclosed events, consistent with investors incurring higher processing costs when using disclosed information.
TI - Disclosure Versus Recognition: Inferences from Subsequent Events
JF - Journal of Accounting Research
DO - 10.1111/1475-679X.12128
DA - 2017-03-01
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/wiley/disclosure-versus-recognition-inferences-from-subsequent-events-BiZ0xyDuKF
SP - 3
EP - 34
VL - 55
IS - 1
DP - DeepDyve
ER -