TY - JOUR
AU - Filatotchev, Igor
AB -  Books reviewed in this essay: Nicolai Foss and Volker Mahnke ( Eds ), Competence, Governance, and Entrepreneurship. Advances in Economic and Strategy Research ( Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2000 ), 337 pages Anna Gandori ( Ed .), Corporate Governance and Firm Organization ( Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2004 ), 397 pages Howard Gospel and Andrew Pendleton ( Eds ), Corporate Governance and Labour Management: An International Comparison ( Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2005 ), 384 pages The last decade has witnessed an explosion in both policy and research devoted to corporate governance. From a theoretical point of view, most of the empirical literature on corporate governance has been rooted in agency theory, and is concerned with linking different aspects of corporate governance with firm performance. The assumption here is that by managing the principal‐agency problem between shareholders and managers, firms will operate more efficiently and perform better. The central premise of this framework is that managers as agents of shareholders (principals) can engage in self‐serving behaviour that may be inconsistent with the shareholders' wealth maximization principle. To constrain managerial opportunism, shareholders may use a diverse range of corporate governance mechanisms, including monitoring 
TI - Corporate Governance and the Firm's Dynamics: Contingencies and Complementarities
JF - Journal of Management Studies
DO - 10.1111/j.1467-6486.2007.00716.x
DA - 2007-09-01
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/wiley/corporate-governance-and-the-firm-s-dynamics-contingencies-and-CMLAP0mdcF
SP - 1041
VL - 44
IS - 6
DP - DeepDyve
ER -