TY - JOUR
AU - EdK-Group
AB - Abstract This paper presents the results of computer simulations with a community of actors playing a large number of voluntarily iterated two-person-PD. The simulations are designed to enable uncooperative actors to exploit partners, leave them and find a new partner who knows nothing about their previous behavioral history. Hit-and-run exploitation should thrive under these conditions. However, as Schuessler (1989; 1990) has shown, the setting is highly unfavorable to uncooperative players. The present study extends this result to a wider set of strategies which can alternatively stay with defectors {and try to improve them) or leave them quickly. In addition, a class of seemingly clever strategies is introduced which try to exploit the expected dynamics of looking for a partner. Still, a high amount of egoistical cooperation can persist in the present scenario.
TI - Exit, Anonymity and the Chances of Egoistical Cooperation
JF - Analyse & Kritik
DO - 10.1515/auk-2000-0106
DA - 2000-05-01
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/de-gruyter/exit-anonymity-and-the-chances-of-egoistical-cooperation-KGCISXUG6L
SP - 114
VL - 22
IS - 1
DP - DeepDyve
ER -