TY - JOUR
AU - Vergara,, Rodrigo
AB - Abstract We propose an explanation for the wide variation in rates of taxation across developed economies, based on differences in labor market institutions. In “corporatist” economies, which feature centralized labor markets, taxes on labor input will be less distortionary than when labor supply is determined individually. Since the level of labor supply is set by a small group of decision-makers, these individuals will recognize the linkage between the taxes that workers pay and the benefits that they receive. Labor tax burdens are indeed higher in more corporatist nations, while nonlabor taxes are actually lower. There is also some evidence that the distortionary effects of labor taxes are lower in more corporatist economies. * We are grateful to Alberto Alesina, James Alt, Bradford De Long, Andrei Shleifer, members of the Harvard/MIT Public Finance Seminar, and especially to Lawrence Katz for helpful comments and suggestions. Gruber acknowledges financial support from the Sloan Foundation and the Harvard Chiles Fellowship. This content is only available as a PDF. © 1993 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and The Massachusetts Institute of Technology
TI - Taxation and the Structure of Labor Markets: The Case of Corporatism
JF - The Quarterly Journal of Economics
DO - 10.2307/2118336
DA - 1993-05-01
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/oxford-university-press/taxation-and-the-structure-of-labor-markets-the-case-of-corporatism-M77j0iD01H
SP - 385
EP - 411
VL - 108
IS - 2
DP - DeepDyve
ER -