TY - JOUR
AU - Iida, Keisuke
AB - Ratification failures are prevalent in international relations, but due to the assumption of unitary actors in international relations theory, theoretical analysis has been underdeveloped. In formalizing Putnam's metaphor of two-level games, this article shows that incomplete information about the preferences of domestic actors is crucial for understanding ratification failures. Furthermore, institutional mechanisms affect bargaining outcomes through their impact on information revelation. In particular, it is found that two-sided constraints lead to relatively equitable bargaining outcomes and that renegotiation and pre-negotiation poll-taking can induce strategic voting by domestic constituents, thereby exacerbating domestic constraints.
TI - Involuntary defection in two-level games
JO - Public Choice
DO - 10.1007/BF00159360
DA - 2004-06-24
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/springer-journals/involuntary-defection-in-two-level-games-MKgAtp1OZy
SP - 283
EP - 303
VL - 89
IS - 4
DP - DeepDyve
ER -