TY - JOUR
AU - White, Lawrence J.
AB - The Antitrust Bulletin/Fall 1995 557 Access and interconnection pricing: how efficient is the "efficient component pricing rule"? BY NICHOLAS ECONOMIDES* and LAWRENCE J. WHITE* 1. Introduction The question of how a monopolist owner of a bottleneck facility should set the price for access to the facility by an entrant or rival supplier of a complementary component continues to be an inter­ esting question for theory and policy.' This question is often * Stem School of Business, New York University, NY. AUTHORS' NOTE: The authors thank Timothy Brennan for helpful com­ ments on an earlier draft of this article. The authors also thank the par­ ticipants at the CEPRICREST-LEI conference on Mobile Telephony, the Utilities Regulation Network conference at the Catholic University of Milan, and of the 1995 Annual National Conference of Economic Research in France for helpful comments and suggestions. See William J. Baumol, Some Subtle Issues in Railroad Deregula­ tion, 10 INT. J. TRANS. Bcox. 341 (1983); Telecom Corporation of New Zealand and Others v. Clear Communications Ltd, Privy Council, House of Lords, U.K. (1994), Curtis M. Grimm & Robert G. Harris, Vertical Foreclosure in the Rail Freight Industry: Economic Analysis and Policy Implications, 5 ICC PRACT. J. 
TI - Access and Interconnection Pricing: How Efficient is the “Efficient Component Pricing Rule”?
JF - The Antitrust Bulletin
DO - 10.1177/0003603X9504000305
DA - 1995-09-01
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/sage/access-and-interconnection-pricing-how-efficient-is-the-efficient-W4tt5KB81L
SP - 557
EP - 579
VL - 40
IS - 3
DP - DeepDyve
ER -