TY - JOUR
AU - 
AB - Citation Fudenberg, Drew, and David K. Levine. 2006. Superstition and rational learning. American Economic Review 96, no. 3: 630-651. Published Version http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.96.3.630 Permanent link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3196330 Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http:// nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA Share Your Story The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Submit a story . Accessibility This version: 9/8/05 First version: 6/5/03 Abstract: We argue that some but not all superstitions can persist when learning is rational and players are patient, and illustrate our argument with an example inspired by the code of Hammurabi. The code specified an “appeal by surviving in the river” as a way of deciding whether an accusation was true, so it seems to have relied on the superstition that the guilty are more likely to drown than the innocent. If people can be easily persuaded to hold this superstitious belief, why not the superstitious belief that the guilty will be struck dead by lightning? We argue that the former can persist but the latter cannot by giving a partial 
TI - Superstition and Rational Learning
JF - SSRN Electronic Journal
DO - 10.2139/ssrn.888774
DA - 2006-01-01
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/unpaywall/superstition-and-rational-learning-XjRJVsPfLL
DP - DeepDyve
ER -