TY - JOUR
AU - Mannemar Sønderskov, Kim
AB - Does generalized social trust help solve large-N collective action problems? This paper argues so, offering a novel explanation for the relationship: People tend to cooperate if they expect others to be cooperating, which implies that people holding generalized social trust more readily cooperate in large-N dilemmas because they expect that most people will cooperate. The paper tests the explanation in a rigorous design. The analyses show a positive, robust effect of generalized social trust on public good provision, but no effect is found in a joint product situation. This supports the hypothesis, indicating that trust specifically enhances cooperation in collective action dilemmas.
TI - Different goods, different effects: exploring the effects ofgeneralized social trust in large-N collective action
JF - Public Choice
DO - 10.1007/s11127-009-9416-0
DA - 2009-03-05
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/springer-journals/different-goods-different-effects-exploring-the-effects-ofgeneralized-evSXKEMENd
SP - 145
EP - 160
VL - 140
IS - 2
DP - DeepDyve
ER -