TY - JOUR
AU1 - P Povel
AB - This article describes optimal bankruptcy laws in a framework with asymmetric information. The key idea is that the financial distress of a firm is not observed by its lenders for quite a while. As early rescues are much cheaper than late rescues, it may pay if the creditors are forgiving in bankruptcy, thereby inducing the revelation of difficulties as early as possible. Either 'tough' or 'soft' bankruptcy laws can be optimal, depending on the parameters. This implies that mandatory one-size-fits-all bankruptcy procedures cannot be optimal. 'Hybrid' procedures, which try to combine elements of soft and tough procedures, are found to be redundant, and possibly harmful. Absolute priority rules may be helpful as a part of tough procedures, but their introduction is (partly) inconsistent with the design of soft procedures. The article also reinterprets much of the evidence on the performance of Chapter 11, the 'rather soft' U.S. reorganization procedure, questioning many negative conclusions. Oxford University Press « Previous | Next Article » Table of Contents This Article JLEO (1999) 15 (3): 659-684. doi: 10.1093/jleo/15.3.659 » Abstract Free Full Text (PDF) Free Classifications Article Services Article metrics Alert me when cited Alert me if corrected Find similar articles Similar articles in Web of Science Add to my archive Download citation Request Permissions Citing Articles Load citing article information Citing articles via CrossRef Citing articles via Scopus Citing articles via Web of Science Citing articles via Google Scholar Google Scholar Articles by Povel, P. Search for related content Related Content Load related web page information Share Email this article CiteULike Delicious Facebook Google+ Mendeley Twitter What's this? Search this journal: Advanced » Current Issue August 2015 31 (3) Alert me to new issues The Journal About this journal Rights & Permissions Dispatch date of the next issue We are mobile – find out more Journals Career Network Impact Factor: 1.205 5-Yr impact factor: 1.444 Editor-in-Chief Wouter Dessein View full editorial board For Authors Instructions to authors Author self-archiving policy Submit now! Submitting Supplementary Data Alerting Services Email table of contents Email Advanced Access CiteTrack XML RSS feed Corporate Services Advertising sales Reprints Supplements var taxonomies = ("LAW00010", "SOC00450", "SOC00720", "SOC01280"); Most Most Read Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations Contract Law and the State of Nature Incentives in Markets, Firms, and Governments The quality of government Juvenile Delinquency and Conformism » View all Most Read articles Most Cited Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control The quality of government Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures » View all Most Cited articles Disclaimer: Please note that abstracts for content published before 1996 were created through digital scanning and may therefore not exactly replicate the text of the original print issues. All efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, but the Publisher will not be held responsible for any remaining inaccuracies. If you require any further clarification, please contact our Customer Services Department. Online ISSN 1465-7341 - Print ISSN 8756-6222 Copyright © 2015 Oxford University Press Oxford Journals Oxford University Press Site Map Privacy Policy Cookie Policy Legal Notices Frequently Asked Questions Other Oxford University Press sites: Oxford University Press Oxford Journals China Oxford Journals Japan Academic & Professional books Children's & Schools Books Dictionaries & Reference Dictionary of National Biography Digital Reference English Language Teaching Higher Education Textbooks International Education Unit Law Medicine Music Online Products & Publishing Oxford Bibliographies Online Oxford Dictionaries Online Oxford English Dictionary Oxford Language Dictionaries Online Oxford Scholarship Online Reference Rights and Permissions Resources for Retailers & Wholesalers Resources for the Healthcare Industry Very Short Introductions World's Classics function fnc_onDomLoaded() { var query_context = getQueryContext(); PF_initOIUnderbar(query_context,":QS:default","","JRN"); PF_insertOIUnderbar(0); }; if (window.addEventListener) { window.addEventListener('load', fnc_onDomLoaded, false); } else if (window.attachEvent) { window.attachEvent('onload', fnc_onDomLoaded); } var gaJsHost = (("https:" == document.location.protocol) ? "https://ssl." : "http://www."); document.write(unescape("%3Cscript src='" + gaJsHost + "google-analytics.com/ga.js' type='text/javascript'%3E%3C/script%3E")); try { var pageTracker = _gat._getTracker("UA-189672-16"); pageTracker._setDomainName(".oxfordjournals.org"); pageTracker._trackPageview(); } catch(err) {}
TI - Optimal 'soft' or 'tough' bankruptcy procedures
JF - The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
DO - 10.1093/jleo/15.3.659
DA - 1999-10-01
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/oxford-university-press/optimal-soft-or-tough-bankruptcy-procedures-sWHRdgpjiu
SP - 659
VL - 15
IS - 3
DP - DeepDyve
ER -