M.C. Jensen (1976)
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structureJournal of Financial Economics, 13
B.K. Boyd (1995)
Duality and Firm Performance: A Contingency ModelStrategic Management Journal, 16
Paula Rechner, D. Dalton (1991)
CEO duality and organizational performance: A longitudinal analysisSouthern Medical Journal, 12
E.F. Fama (1980)
Journal of Political Economy, 88
(1992)
Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance
Scott Barnhart, M. Marr, Stuart Rosenstein (1994)
Firm performance and board composition: Some new evidenceManagerial and Decision Economics, 15
M. Conyon (1994)
Corporate Governance Changes in UK Companies Between 1988 and 1993Corporate Governance: An International Review, 2
D. Yermack (1996)
Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directorsJournal of Financial Economics, 40
April Klein (1998)
Firm Performance and Board Committee Structure1The Journal of Law and Economics, 41
D. Leech, John Leahy (1991)
Ownership Structure, Control Type Classifications and the Performance of Large British CompaniesThe Economic Journal, 101
D. Yermack, Anil Shivdasani (1998)
CEO Involvement in the Selection of New Board Members: An Empirical AnalysisNYU Law & Economics Research Paper Series
E. Fama (2009)
The economic nature of the firm: Agency problems and the theory of the firm
R. Mudambi, C. Nicosia (1998)
Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: Evidence from the UK Financial Services IndustryEuropean Finance eJournal
M.C. Jensen, W.H. Meckling (1976)
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership StructureJournal of Financial Economics, 13
Stephen Brown, W. Goetzmann, R. Ibbotson, S. Ross (1992)
Survivorship Bias in Performance StudiesReview of Financial Studies, 5
E. Fama, M. Jensen (1983)
Separation of Ownership and ControlThe Journal of Law and Economics, 26
Michael Jensen, W. Meckling (1976)
Harvard Business School; SSRN; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Harvard University - Accounting & Control UnitLSN: Law & Finance: Empirical (Topic)
D. Dalton, C. Daily, Alan Ellstrand, Jonathan Johnson (1998)
META-ANALYTIC REVIEWS OF BOARD COMPOSITION, LEADERSHIP STRUCTURE, AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCEStrategic Management Journal, 19
Kenneth Borokhovich, R. Parrino, T. Trapani (1996)
Outside Directors and CEO SelectionJournal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 31
R. Morck, Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny (1988)
Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical AnalysisJournal of Financial Economics, 20
R. Morck, A. Shleifer, R.W. Vishny (1987)
Alternative Mechanisms for Corporate ControlAmerican Economic Review, 79
M. Conyon, C. Mallin (1997)
A Review of Compliance with CadburyJournal of General Management, 22
Brian Main, J. Johnston (1993)
Remuneration Committees and Corporate GovernanceAccounting and Business Research, 23
John Mcconnell, H. Servaes (1990)
Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate valueJournal of Financial Economics, 27
R. Powell (1997)
Modelling Takeover LikelihoodJournal of Business Finance & Accounting, 24
R. Morck (1987)
American Economic Review, 79
B.D. Baysinger (1985)
Journal of Law, Economics and Organisations, 1
R. Morck, A. Shleifer, R.W. Vishny (1988)
Management Ownership and Market ValuationJournal of Financial Economics, 20
B. Baysinger, R. Hoskisson (1990)
The Composition of Boards of Directors and Strategic Control: Effects on Corporate StrategyAcademy of Management Review, 15
B. Baysinger, H. Butler (1985)
Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board CompositionJournal of Law Economics & Organization, 1
R. Mudambi (1998)
Ownership structure and firm performance: evidence from the UK financial services industryApplied Financial Economics, 8
Benjamin Hermalin, M. Weisbach (1988)
The Determinants of Board CompositionThe RAND Journal of Economics, 19
B.D. Baysinger (1990)
The Composition of Boards of Directors and Strategic Control: Effects on Corporate StrategyAcademy of Management Review, 15
B. Boyd (1995)
CEO DUALITY AND FIRM PERFORMANCE: A CONTINGENCY MODELSouthern Medical Journal, 16
H. White (1980)
A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for HeteroskedasticityEconometrica, 48
P.L. Rechner, D.R. Dalton (1991)
CEO Duality and Organisational Performance: A Longitudinal StudyStrategic Management Journal, 12
B. Baliga, R. Moyer, R. Rao (1996)
CEO DUALITY AND FIRM PERFORMANCE: WHAT'S THE FUSS?Strategic Management Journal, 17
E.F. Fama (1980)
Agency Problems and the Theory of the FirmJournal of Political Economy, 88
Stuart Rosenstein, Jeffrey Wyatt (1990)
Outside directors, board independence, and shareholder wealth☆Journal of Financial Economics, 26
H. Demsetz, K. Lehn (1985)
The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and ConsequencesJournal of Political Economy, 93
Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny (1986)
Large Shareholders and Corporate ControlJournal of Political Economy, 94
Sanjai Bhagat, Bernard Black (1998)
The Non-Correlation between Board Independence And Long-Term Firm PerformanceSPGMI: Compustat Fundamentals (Topic)
M. Weisbach (1988)
Outside directors and CEO turnoverJournal of Financial Economics, 20
R. Mudambi, C. Nicosia (1998)
Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: Evidence from the UK Financial Services IndustryApplied Financial Economics, 8
This paper investigates the extent to which recommendations madeby the Cadbury Committee have affected UK company performance.The Committee recommended that certain internal monitoringmechanisms should be adopted by quoted firms because they weremore effective than others as a means of promoting shareholderinterests. The mechanisms analysed are duality, the number ofoutside directors on the board and the presence of a remunerationcommittee. We analyse the relationship between governancestructures and performance for two years, 1992 and 1995. Usingsamples of 200 companies for each of the years, we find that theproportion of firms adopting the governance structuresrecommended by Cadbury has increased. However there is mixedevidence that the structures are associated with betterperformance. Depending on the choice of dependent variable, thepresence of a remuneration committee has a positive effect onperformance and outside director representation has a negativeeffect. However, there is evidence of a simultaneous relationshipbetween outside director representation and performance, a resultconsistent with additional outside directors being appointedafter a period of poor performance. Complete compliance with themodel of governance proposed by the Cadbury Committee does not,however, appear to be associated with performance which is betterthan that achieved by either partial or non compliance.
Journal of Management & Governance – Springer Journals
Published: Oct 16, 2004
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.