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The Reality of (Non‐Aesthetic) Artistic Value

The Reality of (Non‐Aesthetic) Artistic Value It has become increasingly common for philosophers to make use of the concept of artistic value, and, further, to distinguish artistic value from aesthetic value. In a recent paper, ‘The Myth of (Non‐Aesthetic) Artistic Value’, Dominic Lopes takes issue with this, presenting a kind of corrective to current philosophical practice regarding the use of the concept of artistic value. Here I am concerned to defend current practice against Lopes's attack. I argue that there is some unclarity as to what aspect of this practice Lopes is objecting to, and I distinguish three kinds of objection that he could be read as making. I argue that none of these is adequately supported by Lopes's arguments, and that the corresponding three aspects of current philosophical practice are on firmer footing than Lopes's paper suggests. A new, plausible characterisation of artistic value will emerge from this discussion. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Philosophical Quarterly Oxford University Press

The Reality of (Non‐Aesthetic) Artistic Value

The Philosophical Quarterly , Volume 63 (252) – Jul 18, 2013

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Publisher
Oxford University Press
Copyright
© Published by Oxford University Press.
ISSN
0031-8094
eISSN
1467-9213
DOI
10.1111/1467-9213.12026
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

It has become increasingly common for philosophers to make use of the concept of artistic value, and, further, to distinguish artistic value from aesthetic value. In a recent paper, ‘The Myth of (Non‐Aesthetic) Artistic Value’, Dominic Lopes takes issue with this, presenting a kind of corrective to current philosophical practice regarding the use of the concept of artistic value. Here I am concerned to defend current practice against Lopes's attack. I argue that there is some unclarity as to what aspect of this practice Lopes is objecting to, and I distinguish three kinds of objection that he could be read as making. I argue that none of these is adequately supported by Lopes's arguments, and that the corresponding three aspects of current philosophical practice are on firmer footing than Lopes's paper suggests. A new, plausible characterisation of artistic value will emerge from this discussion.

Journal

The Philosophical QuarterlyOxford University Press

Published: Jul 18, 2013

There are no references for this article.