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The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy

The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence, and the Credibility of... http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png American Political Science Review Unpaywall

The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy

KEEFER, PHILIP; STASAVAGE, DAVID
American Political Science Review – Aug 1, 2003
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The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy

KEEFER, PHILIP; STASAVAGE, DAVID
American Political Science Review – Aug 1, 2003

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Publisher
Unpaywall
ISSN
0003-0554
DOI
10.1017/s0003055403000777
Publisher site
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Abstract

Journal

American Political Science Review – Unpaywall

Published: Aug 1, 2003

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