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- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- Copyright © 1993 Wiley Subscription Services
- ISSN
- 0143-6570
- eISSN
- 1099-1468
- DOI
- 10.1002/mde.4090140406
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
Existing literature on the relation between management ownership and firm value has provided competing hypotheses and conflicting evidence. Using samples of Fortune 500‐sized firms in 1976, 1980 and 1984, we find that corporate value measured by Tobin's q is a function of management ownership. Specifically, the q rises when management ownership is between 0% and 5‐7%, and falls as the ownership increases to 10‐12%. Beyond this range, we find that the q continues to fall in the 1976 sample, and starts to rise in the 1980 and 1984 samples. The evidence supports the hypothesis that there is a nonmonotonic relation between management ownership and corporate value.
Journal
Managerial and Decision Economics – Wiley
Published: Jan 1, 1993