Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 7-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Accountability, Integrity, Authenticity, and Self-legislation: Reflections on Ruediger Bittner’s Reflections on Autonomy

Accountability, Integrity, Authenticity, and Self-legislation: Reflections on Ruediger Bittner’s... In this paper I consider three widespread assumptions: (1) the assumption that we are accountable for our intentional actions only if they are in some special sense ours; (2) the assumption that it is possible for us to be more or less “true to” ourselves, and that we are flawed human beings to the extent that we lack “integrity”; and (3) the assumption that we can sometimes give ourselves reasons by giving ourselves commands. I acknowledge that, as Ruediger Bittner has argued, each of these assumptions is problematic, and that the failure to appreciate the problems has led many philosophers astray. I try to show, however, that it is possible to make sense of each assumption in a way that addresses Bittner’s concerns. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Erkenntnis Springer Journals

Accountability, Integrity, Authenticity, and Self-legislation: Reflections on Ruediger Bittner’s Reflections on Autonomy

Buss, Sarah
Erkenntnis , Volume 79 (7) – Oct 23, 2013
Download PDF
14 pages

Loading next page...
 
/lp/springer-journals/accountability-integrity-authenticity-and-self-legislation-reflections-Y00NEWpHOO

References (13)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2013 by Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Subject
Philosophy; Philosophy; Epistemology; Ontology; Ethics; Logic
ISSN
0165-0106
eISSN
1572-8420
DOI
10.1007/s10670-013-9557-x
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

In this paper I consider three widespread assumptions: (1) the assumption that we are accountable for our intentional actions only if they are in some special sense ours; (2) the assumption that it is possible for us to be more or less “true to” ourselves, and that we are flawed human beings to the extent that we lack “integrity”; and (3) the assumption that we can sometimes give ourselves reasons by giving ourselves commands. I acknowledge that, as Ruediger Bittner has argued, each of these assumptions is problematic, and that the failure to appreciate the problems has led many philosophers astray. I try to show, however, that it is possible to make sense of each assumption in a way that addresses Bittner’s concerns.

Journal

Erkenntnis – Springer Journals

Published: Oct 23, 2013

There are no references for this article.