Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 7-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Review: Wayne Andersen, German Artists and Hitler’s Mind: Avant-Garde Art in a Turbulent Era, Boston, MA: Editions Fabriart, 2007; v + 443 pp.; £27.50 hbk; ISBN 0972557326

Review: Wayne Andersen, German Artists and Hitler’s Mind: Avant-Garde Art in a Turbulent Era,... Reviews 223 letter. Finally, Edward Johnson’s incisive assessment of British policy towards an international force to maintain and enforce peace explains why Britain wanted nothing to do with it. To be successful, such a force would depend on enjoying a preponderance of force that could only be brought about if member states first disarmed. But the British, like just about every other state, were reluctant to disarm until they could be certain of their own security, and they never were, because the League of Nations — and later the United Nations — lacked the military means and political will to guarantee that security. It was a conundrum they could never resolve. There is little here to give comfort to those who might believe that diplomats did any good when they tried to relieve international tensions by reducing the burden of arms. In the last resort, most British policy-makers agreed with Lord Salisbury. War was something to be avoided if at all possible. Preparing for war was expensive, and if international agreements could be negotiated that might reduce that expense, so much the better. But in the final analysis the security of Britain and its Empire depended on Britain’s capability http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of Contemporary History SAGE

Review: Wayne Andersen, German Artists and Hitler’s Mind: Avant-Garde Art in a Turbulent Era, Boston, MA: Editions Fabriart, 2007; v + 443 pp.; £27.50 hbk; ISBN 0972557326

Jaskot, Paul B.
Journal of Contemporary History , Volume 45 (1): 3 – Jan 1, 2010
Download PDF
3 pages

Loading next page...
 
/lp/sage/review-wayne-andersen-german-artists-and-hitler-s-mind-avant-garde-art-f34AV1A0Ys

References (0)

References for this paper are not available at this time. We will be adding them shortly, thank you for your patience.

Publisher
SAGE
Copyright
Copyright © by SAGE Publications
ISSN
0022-0094
eISSN
1461-7250
DOI
10.1177/00220094100450011108
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Reviews 223 letter. Finally, Edward Johnson’s incisive assessment of British policy towards an international force to maintain and enforce peace explains why Britain wanted nothing to do with it. To be successful, such a force would depend on enjoying a preponderance of force that could only be brought about if member states first disarmed. But the British, like just about every other state, were reluctant to disarm until they could be certain of their own security, and they never were, because the League of Nations — and later the United Nations — lacked the military means and political will to guarantee that security. It was a conundrum they could never resolve. There is little here to give comfort to those who might believe that diplomats did any good when they tried to relieve international tensions by reducing the burden of arms. In the last resort, most British policy-makers agreed with Lord Salisbury. War was something to be avoided if at all possible. Preparing for war was expensive, and if international agreements could be negotiated that might reduce that expense, so much the better. But in the final analysis the security of Britain and its Empire depended on Britain’s capability

Journal

Journal of Contemporary History – SAGE

Published: Jan 1, 2010

There are no references for this article.