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Considers that an important variable in coalition formation is the size of the coalition. Small coalitions are easier to form than large ones, and in general, they should be more likely to occur. Although this possibility has been suggested, none of the current theories of coalition formation postulate and take into account the inhibiting effects of size. A theory which directly incorporates size as a factor in coalition formation is proposed, and the predictions of the theory are compared with the predictions of the following theories: (a) minimum resource theory, (b) pivotal power theory, and (c) the bargaining theory. These comparisons show that both the minimum resource and pivotal power theories-in their present form-are clearly inadequate. Although the proposed theory and the bargaining theory have weaknesses, they seem to be more accurate in predicting the results of several experiments. (28 ref)
Psychological Review – American Psychological Association
Published: May 1, 1974
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