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We develop a model to explain why the influence of higher-status individuals is oftenaccepted even when status is not an indication of superior information orcompetence. We propose such acceptance as a rational strategy in cases wherecoordination is important. In our model agents must select from among a set ofalternatives after witnessing the choices of some group of initial movers, one ofwhom is assumed to be of high status. These agents would like to select the betteralternative, but would also like to coordinate with as many others as possible. If ahigh-status individual is more prominent, he or she can be used as a coordinationdevice. We determine in what situations agents weigh the behavior of higher-statusagents more heavily than that of other agents, and whether the total utility ofagents is improved as a result of the existence of high-status individuals.
Rationality and Society – SAGE
Published: Aug 1, 2006
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