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Much of the criticism directed toward the results of psychological investigation might serve as a direct challenge to psychologists to clarify their interpretations of psychological phenomena; for a study of those criticisms amply reveals the bizarre views attributed to psychologists. Although this peculiar situation obtains with respect to all psychological descriptions, it is especially striking in the case of perception. Thus, a recent writer finds it necessary to point out that an object is not merely a thing which 'starts a chain of vibrations which eventually results in its own creation.' To the present writer this specific criticism does not really call for a defense of the psychologist's position, since the critic holds substantially the same view as most psychologists, but the very fact that a writer will find much to criticize in any one who supports a similar doctrine is a symptom of a confusing situation which demands at least a restatement of perception. Naturally enough the confusions mentioned reach deeper than the mere matter of exposition and in fact arise directly from the types of conceptions held concerning the process under discussion. A careful reading of psychological literature on perception creates the suspicion that the descriptions fail to tally with the actual facts in the case. As a striking example we find that perception is described as in some sense a creative process which functions in the organization of the discrete qualities constituting the objects of our reaction. In effect, we find practically all current perceptual doctrines very strongly reminiscent of Berkeley's subjectivism albeit modified somewhat a la Reid; the latter modification results in the view that there exists a percept as well as an object of perception. Psychologists cannot but consider the problem of perception as crucial, since the admission of a non-scientific subjectivism at this point will bring disastrous consequences into the entire science of psychology. In this article the writer attempts to suggest a description of perception, which, so far as it goes, consistently complies with the rigorous canons of natural science.
Psychological Review – American Psychological Association
Published: May 1, 1920
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