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- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- © 2018 The Author. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly © 2018 University of Southern California and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
- ISSN
- 0279-0750
- eISSN
- 1468-0114
- DOI
- 10.1111/papq.12146
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
Saul Kripke's influential ‘sceptical paradox’ of semantic rule‐following alleges that speakers cannot have any justification for using a word one way rather than another. If it is correct, there can be no such thing as meaning anything by a word. I argue that the paradox fails to undermine meaning. Kripke never adequately motivates its excessively strict standard for the justified use of words. The paradox lacks the resources to show that its standard is truly mandatory or that speakers do not frequently satisfy the well‐motivated competitor I offer. So the paradox fails.
Journal
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly – Wiley
Published: Jan 1, 2018